On October 26, 2024, Georgians will determine the country’s future in a closely watched election. While most attention has been paid to the names on the ballot, less has been said about the fundamental shift in how votes are cast.

The country’s Central Election Commission (CEC) has been transitioning to electronic voting over the past few years. Officials maintain the new system—which is not connected to the internet and still requires paper ballots—will address voting concerns, especially by reducing the wait for results. Election observers, however, argue that electronic voting does not address the longstanding challenges that have plagued Georgia’s electoral process and, in some cases, may even make them worse.

Electronic elections expedite election results: After polling stations close, the first electronically calculated results will be available within 1.5 to 2 hours. These will be the preliminary results, however, as only hand-counted results will be considered final and legally binding. The preliminary electronic results will be recalculated manually at all polling sites.

While it is true that electronic elections do not fundamentally change the overall process of voting, several nuances will shift for voters, including their experience at the polling station. For instance, upon arrival, a commission member will still greet voters and check if they have already voted. However, instead of proceeding to a registrar based on the first letter of their last name, they will be directed to a verification machine, which contains the voter roll for that specific polling station. Depending on the size of the site, there will be at least two and up to five verification machines. The registrar will verify a voter’s identity using an ID card or Georgian passport, and then issue the ballot.

The general voter list is loaded into the verification device, which activates the specific precinct's list on election day. Some election watchdogs and politicians have expressed concern that they can no longer observe the process of uploading the voter lists to the verification devices. Watchdog organizations can request a precinct-by-precinct voter list from the Central Election Commission, review it, and compare it with the list printed from the device and displayed at the precinct on election day. This serves as one method to verify the authenticity of the voter lists.

Without no oversight during this crucial stage, they worry there is an increased risk of “padding” the voter lists with the names of people who are out of the country and unlikely to return for the elections. This would make it easy for “carousel voting:” someone voting multiple times using the ID cards of people who are not in the country.

"Until now, we’ve had access to everything—not only voter rolls; we can oversee the process of printing ballots at the printing house. If we can observe the printing of ballots, why shouldn’t we have the opportunity to observe the process of loading the lists?” asked Natia Zoidze, Deputy Executive Director of the Center for Development and Democracy.

Another watchdog organization, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), also warns of the risk of carousel voting. A possible solution, according to ISFED, is using electronic devices that verify voters with both ID cards and fingerprints. A similar system is already in use in neighboring Armenia, where machines confirm both the document and the voter's identity through fingerprint verification.

CEC Deputy Chairman Giorgi Sharabidze dismissed these concerns in an interview with Chai Khana.

"Why call it obsolete when the equipment has already been purchased? Someone must prove why this technology has problems and they assume [other technology] does not have them. Our system uses a less unique key, the ID number, not a fingerprint, but that doesn't make a big difference," Sharabidze said.

There are also concerns about the vote counting machines. In the 2024 elections, voters will mark their choice on a paper ballot, which they must place in the machine for digitization. Monitoring organizations fear this process could be problematic. During a pilot test, there were instances when the machine refused to scan a ballot, rejected the paper and returned it to the voter—exposing the contents in the process. Other factors, like weather, may also affect the process. The Center for Development and Democracy’s Zoidze recalled a pilot case in Poti, where rain and humidity caused the ballots to get wet, disrupting the machine’s operation.

The CEC could have purchased a device that would have allow voters to confirm their choices via a touch screen pad, eliminating the need to handle a paper ballot. This also reduces the risk of incorrectly filling out the ballot. The selected choice is printed on the ballot behind transparent glass, allowing the voter to review it without touching it. Once confirmed, the ballot is cut and sent to the ballot box.

"This device meets the paper trail requirement. You can't touch the ballot, so it can't be damaged, removed, or altered. Voting secrecy is also guaranteed. These machines address and safeguard against the challenges faced in Georgian polling stations," explained Giorgi Moniava, a legal specialist at ISFED.

Instead, the CEC purchased devices from Smartmatic, an international company, after it won the state tender worth nearly $55 million. The tender documents show Georgia purchased

6,453 verification devices and 3,601 vote counting machines from the company.

When asked if the CEC took price into consideration when they purchased the devices, Deputy Chairman Giorgi Sharabidze said it was not a factor in the decision.

One key change is in the ballot format. Traditionally, voters could circle their preferred party, cross out others, or even write notes on the ballot. The electronic voting system, however, doesn’t allow such freedom. Instead, voters must carefully follow the instructions to ensure the vote counting machine can accurately register their choice.

In the 2024 parliamentary elections, which will be fully proportional, only parties will appear on the ballot. The new electronic ballot features circles next to each party, which voters must fill/color in using a special pen. The counting machine reads the filled-in pixels inside the circle to record the vote.

Electronic voting has been used several times in Georgia, including during the 2021 local self-government elections, where a trial electronic ballot scanner was tested in the polling stations Tbilisi’s Krtsanisi district. It was also used in two midterm elections in 2023.

ISFED notes that in previous elections, there was little difference between automatically counted and manually counted ballots. The CEC’s Sharabidze said the error rate between manual and machine counting is just 0.013 percent.

ISFED believes that minimizing room for interpretation or subjective judgment improves the election process. But some watchdog organizations, like the Center for Development and Democracy, highlight that the election code mandates that ballots not filled out correctly for the machine to read must be considered invalid.

To mitigate that risk, the center recommends a mandatory review by the commission.

"If the machine can't read the voter's intention but their choice is clear, the commission should be required to review the ballot and not automatically consider it invalid just because the machine couldn't detect the filled circle," it stated.

A computer system is made up of two essential components: hardware, which is the physical device itself, and software, which controls how the device operates. Both components must be thoroughly checked to ensure the machine functions correctly. One key part of the software is the source code, written in a programming language. While the source code may appear unreadable to the average person, experts and programmers can analyze it to understand how the device will function and what tasks it will perform.

The equipment acquired for the 2024 parliamentary elections operates on the same principle. However, the CEC has not allowed watchdog organizations or political parties to observe the provision of either the hardware or software. According to the CEC’s Sharabidze, the level of source code transparency that some are demanding would create cybersecurity risks.

In response to concerns, Sharabidze said an audit was conducted last year by an international firm to check the system’s security.

"Regarding the review of the source code, for the last mid-term and special elections, we invited an independent company, PRO V&V, to conduct an audit. They assessed whether both the devices and the processes complied with international standards and local laws. The political parties were prioritized and received the audit results first, with a representative from the auditing company available to answer their questions,” he explained.

The audit report is publicly available and confirms the system passed the audit. However Smartmatic does not prohibit access to the source code. According to the company’s website, transparency is key to ensuring trusted election outcomes. The company actively pushes for stakeholders to conduct source code audits and that the source code is, as a rule, available to political parties and accredited organizations for extensive scrutiny.

Since machine tallies will be manually recounted in this year’s election, with hand-counted results deemed final, the necessity of open source code may be less critical. Hypothetically, it wouldn’t make sense for machines to produce results that significantly differ from manual counts. Additionally, the 2024 parliamentary elections will take place offline, meaning the voting machines will not be network-connected. While that precaution helps reduce cyber risks, such as external interference or code manipulation, it doesn't eliminate all potential threats.

Any non-networked device, including the entire system of voting machines (both software and hardware), must be rigorously inspected to confirm it is truly air-gapped—completely isolated from the Internet—and to ensure no remote communication channels can connect to it. In 2018, The New York Times’ The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine highlighted the vulnerabilities of electronic voting machines. The article discussed a case where remote access programs were discovered on such devices.

To minimize risks, it is essential to conduct thorough testing and auditing of the entire system by an independent third party. This process can uncover not only software errors but also hardware issues and other inconsistencies. Furthermore, after a comprehensive review of both the hardware and software components, it is crucial that all parties involved receive sufficient objective assurance that no changes will be made to any part of the system. The voting process must then proceed using the audited devices and software," says Giorgi Iashvili, an international consultant specializing in election technologies and cybersecurity.

ISFED is also working on a way to remotely detect if a device is connected to the internet. While the organization doesn't anticipate anyone attempting to alter data when accessing the software—since the results will still require manual recalculation—there are other concerns.

"During the elections, they [ruling party] could monitor vote counts, keep track of the process, and identify who's leading, allowing them to mobilize their supporters accordingly. This was something coordinators did during traditional elections by tracking voter turnout; it's just easier to do electronically now. That's why we're working to mitigate these risks and adjust our methodology to address the challenges posed by electronic systems," noted ISFED’s Moniava.

On September 18, it was announced that the CEC will conduct a new audit through PRO V&V. The audit will be carried out in three stages, both before and on election day. Monitoring organizations were not involved during the audit's preparation phase, and, as was the case last year, they will be able to review the audit report and ask questions.

Election participants, including observers and political party representatives, often stress that elections are not manipulated on election day or at polling stations. Rather, the most concerning violations take place in the pre-election period and the events surrounding election precincts. One of the major ongoing challenges is the attempt to control voters’ behavior, a persistent issue in Georgia's recent electoral history.

In 2021, CRRC-Georgia conducted a study on public perceptions of election-related processes. The results showed that only 31 percent of Georgians believe it is impossible for someone to know how another person voted. A larger portion (44 percent) thinks it is possible, while 25 percent are unsure whether a person's vote can be known. Some watchdog organizations fear that incorporating electronic elements into the election process could further intensify voters' misconceptions on this issue.

"One form of pressure used to be telling voters, 'We know who you will vote for.' Now, with the introduction of electronic technology—which many voters may not fully understand—this tactic has evolved. Instead of threats, coercion, or small bribes, people are now told, 'With this new technology, I can find out who you voted for.' This kind of pressure has become even easier to apply," explained ISFED’s Giorgi Moniava.

To prepare voters, the CEC has been promoting the transition from traditional to electronic elections. While its leadership is pleased with the intensity of the campaign, some monitoring organizations are less satisfied. They also believe that political parties are not doing enough to counter disinformation effectively.

So far, the new voting machines were tested during mid-term and local self-government elections. Additionally, voters had the chance to try them out at metro stations, simulated election processes were conducted in hundreds of precincts, and public officials, educational institutions, and state service centers have had access to the technology.

According to CEC Chairman Giorgi Kalandarishvili, "over half a million voters have been directly informed about the technological aspects." This represents about 15 percent of the total electorate.

As part of the campaign, the CEC has been distributing informational videos via digital and traditional media channels. One of these videos specifically addresses voter privacy, explaining in just 30 seconds that the ballot does not contain any identifying information, and the machine does not track when individual ballots are cast, ensuring the secrecy of the ballot. It has been viewed 136,000 times on Facebook.

The monitoring organizations interviewed by Chai Khana, despite raising concerns about the election process, including electronic technologies related, do not question the protection of voter privacy. They also do not see the electronic devices as a source of issues in this aspect.

"The secrecy of the vote is fully guaranteed, with no possible way— even theoretically— to identify which voter chose which candidate, including through the devices. The ballot given to the voter contains no information that could link it to an individual. Additionally, the verification and voting devices are not connected, meaning they cannot synchronize the verification process with the vote cast," says Giorgi Moniava from ISFED.